Today Charles Clarke takes the identity cards bill back to Parliament. He claims that he has accepted genuine worries that have been raised about the previous bill, which failed following its third reading due to insufficient time at the end of the parliamentary session. However yet again the same old clichés are being trotted out by the government and its apologeticsin an attempt to sell this rotten, corrupt piece of legislation. We are told that identity cards will combat fraud, terrorism, illegal working and immigration, and that it will provide a one-stop shop to prove our identity.
Now is the time perhaps, to remind people of just what exactly identity cards do and do not do:
- ID cards will protect us from terrorism: They will do nothing of the sort. Those responsible for the bombings in Madrid and the outrage in New York all carried valid identity documents. The new breed of terrorist; the suicide bomber, does not wish to hide his or her identity. Indeed they want the world to know who they are and are prepared to star in a video prior to the event to prove it. Until they carry out their activities they are unknown to the authorities. Those who are known will use forged identity documents. It is worth bearing in mind that our erstwhile Home Secretary, David Blunkett was forced to admit on television and radio that identity cards will not combat terrorism. Not to put too fine a point on it; that identity cards will combat terrorism is a lie.
- They will tackle crime: Since when has the necessity for carrying identity documents stopped such people as bank robbers, rapists, muggers and murderers? Those countries that already have compulsory identity card systems are no less vulnerable to these types of crime. It is also worth bearing in mind that the type of crime the Home Secretary is particularly keen on mentioning is identity theft. All too often it is not identity theft at all. They quote a figure of £1.3 billion per annum as the cost of identity theft, yet this is a disingenuous figure. Much of what the government touts as identity crime is in fact nothing more than straightforward fraud such as the customer not present deception. This is not identity theft. Indeed the only effect that a high level document such as identity cards will have on crime is to increase it and make it simpler. Organised gangs will be rubbing their hands in glee at the introduction of a whole new revenue stream courtesy of her Majesty’s government.
- The government will make sure that our personal details remain secure and private: No, they won’t. Any information on the national information register will document where we live, what we earn, our medical details, where we have lived, who we work for, criminal records, purchases over £200, biometric information such as fingerprints or iris scans, and possibly within a few years a DNA sample. This information will be available to government officials in different departments. Not only will they have access, but those private companies employed by the government to manage information. And if you believe that this will not find its way into the hands of private companies and those who would use it to defraud us, I have a nice little piece of real estate going cheap, just for you in the Chernobyl district.
- Cost: Present estimates are that it will cost around £85. Of course, if you lose it there will be a fee. Also should there be any incorrect information, you will have to pay to correct it. You will also have to pay to move or get married.
- Immigration: The idea that identity cards will in some way control immigration is laughable. People smugglers will continue to operate and they will do so with the added bonus of being able to sell their victims forged identity documents. There are those who say, messrs Blunkett and Clarke among them, that being biometric, the cards will not be able to be forged. Given that perfectly legitimate biometrics have a one in ten failure rate, and that not every outlet will have a biometric reader, this aspect of the argument is significantly weak. Biometric technology is not a panacea. Not only is the technology new and therefore immature, but it is inherently insecure because should your biometric details be compromised, they remain compromised until you die. A conventional password is at least something you may change should someone gain access to it. Oh, yes, of course they will be forged.
- Benefit fraud: It is possible that should somebody attempt to use a false name to obtain benefits, identity cards may have a small impact. However over 90% of benefit fraud is conducted by people using their real names but concealing their circumstances; convincing a doctor they are too ill to work, or working cash in hand while claiming unemployment benefit.
The only beneficiary of the identity cards bill with its underpinning national identity register is the government, its agencies and their minions. This will give the government and its employees and employees of those private companies that it engages carte blanche to snoop on British citizens in a routine manner that has not been possible before. Technology is the servant of people not the other way round.
Lord Goddard’s judgment in 1951 reflected human behaviour; the relationship between the authorities – the police – and the public. In the half-century that has passed since that judgment human behaviour has not changed one wit. Lord Goddard’s judgment is as valid today as it was when he made it. Consequently Identity Cards will turn us into a “papers please” state. This is a bad piece of legislation in the making. It is dangerous, one of the building blocks of a totalitarian state, we must resist it.
Longrider wrote, starting:
“The government will make sure that our personal details remain secure and private: No, they won’t. Any information on the national information register will document …”
Of the things listed, the following are planned to be recorded in the Governments proposed National Identity Register:
(i) where we live,
(ii) biometric information such as fingerprints or iris scans,
(iii) where we have lived,
The following are, totally to to a significant extent, not planned (as I understand it, having read reams of stuff from the Home Office):
(a) what we earn,
(b) our medical details,
(c) who we work for,
(d) criminal records,
(e) purchases over £200,
(f) and possibly within a few years a DNA sample.
There is quite a lot wrong with what the Government propose. By distracting and/or misleading the public (and perhaps yourself), that which might be put right may well end up not being put right. Thus, if the total anti-ID case is lost, we will be worse off than otherwise might be the case.
Could you not please find a way of presenting the case against, that correctly identifies particular deficiencies (and perhaps how they could be put right), while also not losing the ability to argue on other and more general grounds (eg those relating to civil liberties and the British way) that the whole scheme is a bad idea.
Best regardsNigel Sedgwick [[email protected]]
[Longrider replies] It was always planned that ID cards will be used for employment purposes – how else will it “tackle illegal employment”? The original consultation document for “entitlement” cards discussed using them to apply for employment. Transactions (or times when the NIR is accessed) will be recorded. Put two and two together.
There are plans for medical records to be centralised and available using web technology – of course it will end up being a part of the register. It would be naive to think otherwise. The same will apply to criminal records – not to put them on the NIR flies in the face of the whole scheme. Again, the “entitlement” element applies to access to healthcare. And, again, access to the NIR will be recorded. Or, as the Home Office’s press release put it: Ensures checks can be made against other databases to confirm an applicant’s identity and guard against fraud.
“Not planned” is Home Office double speak – this will be enabling, i.e. things like DNA will be able to be added at will without going through parliament.
You might want to read the Home Office’s research document section 7.4 where it clearly discusses purchases over £200.
Not everything that the government is “planning” is in the bill.
While criticising me, perhaps you might like to see what Liberty has to say…
It looks like the fee has already risen to £93 a time now, according the the Explanatory Notes
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmbills/009/en/06009x-c.htm
Why are they charging VAT ?Watching Them, Watching Us [[email protected]]
[Longrider replies] Charging VAT is taking the piss. Things are happening so quickly today, it’s difficult to keep up. I realised that the cost had gone up after I made this entry. I also notice on the BBC news this evening that cost is likely to be an issue and the Home Office acknowledges this.
[Nigel Sedgwick replies to Longrider’s reply, at length, with apologies for that]
[Longrider replies] It was always planned that ID cards will be used for employment purposes – how else will it “tackle illegal employment”?
The bill currently before Parliament, clause 1(7)(a,b,c), calls for the NIR to record nationality, entitlement to remain, terms of said entitlement. I take this to mean a record of right to residence, study and employment. Therefore a prospective employer would be able to check whether the job applicant (perhaps only after a decision to offer the job) has the right to work in the UK.
There is no requirement in the current bill to record any of: (a) what we earn, or (c) who we work for.
A record of the person/organisation making the enquiry may well appear in the audit trail.
Indefinite retention of the audit trail (clause 1(5)(h) of the current bill) is one of the issues I think should be changed. It’s primary purpose should be a contribution towards protection of individual privacy against unauthorised NIR access. Thus records should be retained only as long as the individual requires (perhaps with a minimum of say 1 year for “system protection purposes”. Retention at the “pleasure” of the Government is surely just “big brother surveillence”, and should go.
[Longrider replies] There are plans for medical records to be centralised and available using web technology – of course it will end up being a part of the register. It would be naive to think otherwise. The same will apply to criminal records …
Why will it (medical/criminal records) end up as part of the NIR? They already exist or may soon anyway, and really have nothing to do with with proposed NIR.
[Longrider replies] “Not planned” is Home Office double speak – this will be enabling … [and] … Not everything that the government is “planning” is in the bill.
I am concerned that this is evidence of paranoia. The whole of government, world-wide, is a slippery slope. In the UK, Parliament can only chose to legislate on what is before it, ensuring that that is all that passes into law. It cannot legislate for future actions that it does not want a future parliament to pass.
On the issue of the current bill being partially an “enabling bill” I do agree that this is one of the things that is bad. Most if not all of the enabling elements should be deleted from the bill. Any remaining should be minor and most limited in their potential effect.
[Longrider replies] You might want to read the Home Office’s research document section 7.4 where it clearly discusses purchases over £200.
I take this to be: “Identity Card: People with Special Issues: Response to the Proposed Customer Experience”, Dec 2004, available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs4/special_issues_research.pdf.
From section 7.3, Different Levels of Verification, I find this:
“As examples, they [the people interviewed] understood that situations requiring a low level of verification … might include … Situations requiring an intermediate level of verification … paying for goods up to a specified level – £100/200 … Examples of a higher level of verification … were expected to be when making higher level purchases (more than £200), opening bank accounts, …”
Now this is a low quality piece of work, especially that equating the need for equivalent higher security for opening bank accounts (a good idea that the Government may well add to money-laundering regulations) and for purchases exceeding £200 (which is a decision purely for the retailer/bank and is, I agree, so low a limit as to be silly as a blanket threshold).
However, discussing examples of what retailers might do (or might not do) is surely different from your claim that the Governemnt intends to record all purchases over £200, presumably by passing a law that all such purchases must by verified by a check on the NIR database.
The most that would happen, with the current bill, would be an audit trail entry, on which above I have called for deletion largely at the decision of the registered individual.
[Longrider replies] While criticising me, perhaps you might like to see what Liberty has to say…
I have read everything I have found from Liberty on ID Cards, and very good I have found it too. Likewise Justice (nearly all good) and Privacy International (good in several, but not all, parts).
If there are any parts of Liberty’s view that support your side in our current frank exchange of views, I don’t remember them off the top of my head. However, if you give adequate reference, I will go and check.
I repeat my plea. Could you not please find a way of presenting the case against, that correctly identifies particular deficiencies (and perhaps how they could be put right), while also not losing the ability to argue on other and more general grounds (eg those relating to civil liberties and the British way) that the whole scheme is a bad idea.
Best regardsNigel Sedgwick [[email protected]]