Last night’s crash at Ufton Nervet in Berkshire is another blow not only to the industry as a whole, but the Western Region in particular. During the last few years it has had more than its fair share of tragic incidents, Maidenhead, Southall and Ladbroke Grove being the most high profile.
During my tenure as signalling manager at Westbury, we had a similar crossing incident at Greenland Mill crossing near Bradford on Avon. A car attempting to reverse out of the lane across the crossing dropped a wheel off the bowmac and became stuck. The signaller was unable to stop the approaching train and a collision resulted. Fortunately on that occasion there were no casualties.
What struck me then was how potentially dangerous automatic half barrier crossings are. CCTV crossings are monitored by the signaller and the barriers are only lowered and the signal cleared once the signaller has seen that the crossing is clear. AHBs on the other hand are remotely operated by the passage of the train and the signaller has no means of monitoring what is happening. Also, the potential ability for vehicles to zigzag is an added risk.
Worse still are occupation crossings that are user operated, relying only on a telephone conversation between the user and the signaller. If people cross without calling, the results can be catastrophic.
If it was down to me, I’d close the lot.
(also posted to Transportblog) – It seems off to blame the signalling technology rather than the drivers.
There’s no reason other than idiocy or deathwishes why AHBs should lead to car/train collisions. And in terms of policy outcomes, the large number of car/train collisions here (along with the larger numbers of car/car, car/motorbike, car/cycle, car/pedestrian collisions elsewhere) says more about the inadequacies of driver licensing than the inadequacies of railway infrastructure.john b
As an ex driving instructor, broadly, I agree.
However, my dislike of AHBs is a direct result of dealing with them. This particular type of crossing allows greater potential for misuse. Also, there is no failsafe as with, for example, CCTV. With CCTV, the signaller will not lower the barriers and press the crossing clear button until the crossing is observed to be clear. With AHBs being operated by trackside treadles, the signaller know nothing until something goes wrong.
Okay, so on balance we don’t see many accidents like this statistically. However, the design certainly contributes to the potential risk even if it is not a direct cause.