Yesterday’s rail crash was the third level crossing incident in a matter of six weeks or so. Doubtless there will be calls for something to be done. However, as the leader in this month’s Safety & Health Practitioner points out:
The Reading rail crash once again saw immediate cries of ‘something must be done’. But direct involvement in the loss of life is not the best foundation for clear thinking.
And they make the point that:
While seven people died in the derailment outside Reading, more died on the roads. Rail remains the safest way to travel, and in terms of the number of fatal accidents over the past 40 years has been getting progressively safer.
Valid points but ones likely to be drowned out in the emotive fallout that so often occurs following a train disaster. Unfortunately, inquiries after the event all too often lead to misguided recommendations. The Cullen inquiry following Ladbroke Grove contained a plethora of such recommendations that overwhelmed the industry to the point of causing stasis. Even now, some five years after the crash in October 1999, many of those recommendations remain just that; recommendations.
What is needed now is clear thinking. Level crossings do, indeed, present a risk. The automatic half barrier that was the centre of the recent Reading crash has significant design flaws. Unlike, for example, a CCTV controlled crossing, the controlling signaller does not have a view of the crossing. It is operated by a treadle on the track that is triggered by the approaching train. This causes the barriers to fall and the road lights to light. Thirty seconds later, the train reaches the crossing. The logic behind the half barrier arrangement is that drivers can continue if the sequence starts when they are part way across. Unfortunately, there is always the possibility that people will zigzag across in an attempt to beat the train. There is nothing that tells the signalling system that the crossing is clear – so if it isn’t, a crash will ensue. I believe a review of AHB crossings is appropriate, but a rush to remove them is not. After all, during their lifetime the amount of incidents is miniscule compared to other road related crashes.
Last nights crash was on another type of crossing. The user controlled crossing relies on communication between the user and the signaller. Users are required to telephone the signalbox and ask for permission to cross. Unfortunately, if they don’t, the signaller knows nothing about it until the crash. Again, a review is in order – and certainly there is a case for some (many, possibly) to be closed. But, again, as the Safety & Health Practitioner requests;
…it is essential that practitioners continue to sound the voice of reason, of consideration, of balance
Exactly
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